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INTRODUCTION 
The jurisdictional statement, nature of proceedings, state-
ment of issues on appeal and statement of facts are adquately 
covered in the Defendant's opening brief. This brief is sub-
mitted in reply to Respondent's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was neither strict nor substantial compliance with the 
mandate of Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
when the Defendant entered his guilty plea in this case. 
Although the Defendant executed an Affidavit when he pleaded 
guilty, the trial court did not determine on the record that the 
Defendant understood the nature and elements of the offense to 
which he entered his guilty plea. Significantly, the Amended 
Information was not read to the Defendant. Moreover, counsel and 
the trial court identified the offense with a variety of differ-
ent names. The Defendant never admitted any facts on the record 
which constituted the offense of Attempted Aggravated Sexual 
Abuse of a Child. The trial court neither read the facts or 
elements recited in the "Affidavit of Defendant" nor requested 
that the Defendant acknowledge those facts or elements. 
Similarly, the trial judge did not advise the Defendant on the 
record of what sentence might be imposed before the guilty plea 
was received. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF) 
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED 
IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11(e)(4) AND (5) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
The State's interpretation of State v. Thurston,, 781 P. 2d 
1296 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) is creative but imprecise. The State 
interprets this case to mean that at least one panel of the Court 
of Appeals has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated 
in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) and 
State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). However, 
the panel writing the decision in State v. Thurston made no such 
statement. The State may wish to interpret Thurston in such a 
fashion. But there is no clear prenouncement in Thurston that 
Vasilacopulos and Valencia were either abandoned or overruled by 
the panel which authored Thurston. 
Moreover, the facts in Thurston involve a unique Rule 11 
situation. Thurston really involved the interpretation of the 
principle that a defendant is entitled to specific performance of 
a plea negotiation; See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 
(1971). Thurston plead guilty to two counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges against the defendant and to recommend probation rather 
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than incarceration. The State, by and through its deputy county 
attorney, fulfilled all the terms of the plea negotiation. That 
is to say, the State did dismiss the additional charges and did 
affirmatively recommend probation rather than incarceration. 
However, the unique problem which arose in Thurston was that 
notwithstanding the deputy county attorney's affirmative recom-
mendation for probation, the presentence report included the 
opinion of the investigating officer "that fifteen years was not 
a long enough term of incarceration for the defendant." The 
Court of Appeals concluded that an investigating police offer is 
not bound by a prosecutor's plea bargain to recommend probation. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals decided that the defendant's 
plea bargain agreement had not been breached. 
The defendant in Thurston also argued that his guilty plea 
was involuntary and should be stricken because he entered the 
plea in reliance upon the State's recommendation for probation, 
and that his reliance was misplaced because of the investigating 
police officer's contrary sentencing recommendation. In consid-
ering that contention, the Court of Appeals reviewed the record 
and determined that the defendant had been fully informed of his 
rights and the consequences of the guilty plea. In dismissing 
the defendant's contention that he should be permitted to with-
draw his plea, the Court of Appeals noted that the "defendant's 
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mere subjective belief as to a potential sentence is insufficient 
to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing." 781 
P.2d at 1302. 
The facts in Thurston are unique and completely different 
from the Rule 11 violation in the instant case. Regardless of 
what standard was articulated by the Court of Appeals in 
Thurston, whether it was the record as a whole or strict compli-
ance, there simply was no Rule 11 violation. 
The State has also argued that Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 
1148 (Utah 1989), and State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988), stand for the proposition that the record as a whole test 
is the test to be applied regardless of whether the plea in issue 
was a pre- or post-Gibbons plea. The Defendant submits that the 
State is wrong in this regard. Jolivet, Copeland, and State v. 
Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), all involve guilty pleas entered 
prior to State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). This is a 
significant distinction. 
Although it is true that all three of these cases discuss 
the substantial compliance or record as a whole test, they are 
pre-Gibbons cases. State v. Gibbons was not given retroactive 
application. That was so because a new rul€* of criminal proce-
dure constituting a clear break with the past will not be applied 
retroactively. Rather, in those circumstances where a defendant 
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challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea under Rule 11 
after State v. Gibbons was decided, but when the guilty plea was 
actually entered prior to the pronouncement of State v. Gibbons, 
supra, this Court has adopted the record as a whole test. See 
Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985). 
Jolivet, Copeland, and Kay are not inconsistent with the 
rule announced in State v. Gibbons: 
Because of the importance of compliance with 
Rule 11(e) in Boykin, the law places the burden 
of establishing compliance with those require-
ments on the trial judge .... the use of a 
sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, 
but an affidavit should be only the starting 
point, not an end point, in the pleading pro-
cess .... the trial judge should then review 
the statements in the affidavit with the defen-
dant, question the defendant concerning his 
understanding of it, and fulfill the other 
requirements imposed by Section 77-35-11 on the 
record before accepting the guilt plea. 
(Emphasis added). 
740 P.2d at 1313. 
In the instant matter, on the issues of whether the Defen-
dant understood the nature and elements of the offense as well as 
the possible sentence, the State can only rely upon the "Affida-
vit of Defendant." The State's contention that the Defendant had 
previously appeared in Circuit Court where he had waived his 
preliminary hearing is hardly any support for the proposition 
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that the Defendant understood either the nature or the elements 
of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. Similarly, the 
State's argument that because the Defendant's counsel waived a 
formal reading of the Information and acknowledged that he (the 
defense counsel) had received a copy of the Information hardly 
supports the ineluctible conclusion that the Defendant understood 
the nature and elements of the offense to which he was pleading 
guilty. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not a case even remotely similar to Jolivet or 
Copeland where the record clearly demonstrates substantial 
efforts by the trial court to ensure that the Defendant under-
stood the nature and elements of the offenses to which they 
pleaded guilty. In contrast, there is nothing but an affidavit 
in the instant case. The record in the instant matter estab-
lishes substantial confusion over even the title of the offense, 
much less the nature and elements of the offense. The record as 
a whole does not establish that the Defendant understood either 
the nature and elements of the offense or the possible sentence 
that could be imposed. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., 
Attorney for Appellant 
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